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DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPT
THE ROAD TO KAVANAUGH, MARCH 15,
2019, GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
ANTHONY NIEDWIECKI: Dean of the School of Law, Professor of Law,
Golden Gate University School of Law.
DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS:
PAUL KIBEL, Professor of Law; Co-Director of the Environmental Law
Program, Golden Gate University School of Law.
CAROLINE FREDRICKSON, President of the American Constitution
Society.
DEAN NIEDWIECKI: For those that don’t know, I’m Anthony Niedwiecki.
I’m the Dean of the Golden Gate University School of Law. I want to
welcome you to this exciting presentation. This idea grew out of the ac-
tual confirmation process that maybe, we need to do something and have
a discussion about this particular process.
I’m an employment discrimination lawyer. So watching those hear-
ings [was] very reminiscent of the Anita Hill hearings back many, many
years ago, but what I use as an example of sexual harassment and the
treatment of sexual harassment law at the time. So this was a very inter-
esting period for us. And I know around the school, all the TVs were on
and everybody was watching very closely.
And so, we have a lot of interest here on the confirmation process,
but also a lot of interest with what the Supreme Court is going to look
like now that Kavanaugh’s joined the bench.
And so today, we’re really, really happy to be able to welcome the
President from ACS to join our discussion with one of our professors
73
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about the Kavanaugh confirmation process and the impact that he will
have on the court. I have a really deep interest, and I’m very proud to
say, I’ve been with ACS and supported ACS from the very beginning.
I’ve been a faculty advisor at two previous schools that I worked at.
And I was sharing that I have a couple of my best memories as a profes-
sor related to ACS. I went to their national conference in 2003. And this
was right after Lawrence v. Texas was decided. And Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, as most the students here know is a big idol of mine, spoke at lunch
that day and talked a lot about the influence of international precedent
and international materials in Supreme Court cases.
And that was a heated issue at the time. And it seeped its way into
the Lawrence decision. That was a very, very interesting discussion and
the first time I saw her actually speak. But the more interesting and
funn[ier] thing for me was later that night at the convention, they had a
Janet Reno dance party. And I got to dance with Janet Reno. So I have
very fond memories of ACS.
[Laughter]
ACS has done a lot of great things and really has moved law schools
and the legal profession to look at things from a progressive bent. The
Federal Society has been very good over the history in terms of building
up a strong bench. And ACS came in to do the same thing. I know that
[at] one of my former schools I was enemy number one for the Federal
Society, because we started the ACS. Because I think they knew the pos-
sibilities, and that’s been realized.
So, let me introduce our two guests today. President Fredrickson
joined ACS in 2009 as their President. During her tenure, ACS has
grown significantly. They have chapters in almost every law school.
They’ve got thousands of members across the county. And they’ve got
chapters in almost all the states.
Before she joined the ACS, she was a director of ACLU’s Washing-
ton Legislative Office; General Counsel and Legal Director of [Unintel-
ligible] Pro-Choice America. She served as Chief of Staff to Senator
Maria Cantwell of Washington and Deputy Chief of Staff to Senate
Democratic Leader, at the time, Tom Daschle of South Dakota.
She worked in the Clinton Administration. She served as Special
Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs. She has her JD from
Columbia and her BA from Yale in Russian and Eastern European Stud-
ies. She also clerked for the Honorable James Oaks of the United States
Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. So, with this wide range of exper-
iences, you know she’s going to bring a lot to the discussion today.
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She’s joined by our own professor, Paul Kibel. I really want to thank
him. He took the lead in organizing this. And he saw the value of this
discussion. But I do want to note one thing. We did invite members from
the Federalist Society. And nobody took our offer. So, you can interpret
that however you want to about today’s discussion.
Professor Kibel, who organized this, is a prolific scholar. He teaches
environmental law and water law. He is the Director of our Center for
Urban Environmental Law. Our environmental law program is, as you
know, consistently ranked as one of the top environmental law programs
across the country and a lot due to the work that he does. He’s been a
wonderful faculty member. And I know he’s going to bring a lot to the
table for the discussion.
Before I bring them up on the stage, I want to say thank you to the
Bar Association of San Francisco and all the people at GGU who have
made this happen today. So, without further ado, let’s bring up our
guests: Paul Kibel and Caroline Fredrickson.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: We’re not going to wear our microphones.
FREDRICKSON: We’ll project.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Thank you for those introductory remarks, Dean. I
want to say a couple things at the outset. Thank you so much for coming
out today. We’re really excited for this conversation. We are going to be
recording it for two reasons. One, the plan is to propose the video of the
dialogue in conjunction with Golden Gate’s Law Review.
We’re also going to be preparing a transcription of the proceedings
with an idea towards actually publishing the exchange that we have here,
as well. And my understand is also that you are working with the law
review on a piece related to the Kavanaugh [unintelligible] for the law
review, as well. So there will be some scholarly outputs.
I want to begin to explain the format that we’ve settled on, which I
hope should work well. We’ve divided the dialogue into part one and
part two. Part one is going to be about the confirmation and appointment
process that took place related to Brett Kavanaugh. And we’re going to
spend about 30 minutes.
We’ve worked up some question and discussion topics about that.
After we have that dialogue, we’re going to open it up to questions on
that part of it to the audience for about 10 minutes or so, for questions
and discussion with all of you related to that.
For part two, we’re going to shift gears and talk about jurisprudence
and talk about issues relating to how having Brett Kavanaugh on the
Court may change the Court’s decision making, looking at issues such as
3
Kibel and Fredrickson: Discussion Transcript
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
76 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
originalism, federalism, executive authority, abortion, women’s repro-
ductive rights, and views of deference to federal agencies; issues that are
related to what he will bring as a justice on the court, as opposed to the
appointment process.
And the last thing I’ll mention — just to elaborate — when this
began, the idea was to have three chairs up here. I don’t know about
three tables, but certainly three chairs. And the other chair was going to
be occupied by a representative from the Federalist Society. We thought
it would be very productive in a dialogue format, as opposed to speech
format, to have that type of discussion.
We contacted a number of prominent people: Steve Calabresi, pro-
fessor at Northwestern, one of the co-founders of the Federalist Society;
Professor Oren Currey at USC Law School; and Professor Jonathan
Hadler at Case Western. We even contacted George Conway III. George
Conway III — Kelly Conway’s husband, but also prominent legal
thinker on the conservative side and helped co-found [unintelligible]
Checks and Balances recently.
I’m not going to speculate about the reasons. But we did not have
any takers for that. So we were left with the decision about whether or
not to proceed with the dialogue or proceed with the dialogue with just
Carolyn. And we felt like the fact that we didn’t get a response from the
people we approached was not a reason not to proceed, at least
[unintelligible].
FREDRICKSON: We got a response. It was just, “No.”
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Well, the only real “no” we got was from Calabresi. I
think the others were more nuanced. “We’d love to. But we’re so busy”
type responses. But before we get into the format, I wanted to give you
time to talk about how you view the role of ACS in terms of its forma-
tion in particular, as the Dean mentioned, in some sense its relationship
or maybe, a leftist counterpart to the Federalist Society. I wanted to give
you a chance to talk.
FREDRICKSON: Sure. First, let me thank you, the law school, the Dean,
and all of you for hosting me here and for our ACS chapters that have
been involved. I know we have a great, strong chapter here at Golden
Gate. I hope you’re all members. If not, you can sign up immediately
after this discussion. But I also wanted to wish a happy birthday to Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, whose birthday is today and also, the Dean, who I know
is celebrating his birthday this weekend.
I think that’s auspicious. to be sharing a birthday with Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, may she live forever. And I think she is. I actually had a
4
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chance, on the plane out here, I finally caught up with the documentary.
And to see her working out with her trainer and looking quite robust and
fit. And I know she’s back in full action after her . . .
You know, she is really, absolutely a board. This is her third bout
with cancer. She’s still doing all her pushups and workouts and so forth.
And she’s really indestructible. It’s so impressive.
So ACS. I’d also like to think we’re indestructible. But we’re a na-
tion-wide network committed to the fundamental values of the constitu-
tion. “We the people in order to form a more perfect union,” the
preamble to the Constitution lays out, in such beautiful and empowering
and inspirational language, what this nation is dedicated to achieving:
effective government, democracy, liberty, and justice for all.
And with the Post-Reconstruction Amendments, we add equality to
that list of core values that we believe in; that absolutely infiltrate every-
thing we believe about the law and Constitution values.
So I would encourage you — and we have a constitutional law pro-
fessor in the room — next time you’re thinking about the Constitution
and questions, go back and read the Preamble. It’s not there just to look
pretty at the beginning and have the big W, you know. They wrote beau-
tifully back then. It’s actually there to tell you how to understand the
document that follows.
So that’s what we are deeply committed to. We’ve been building a
network across this country of lawyers, law professors, law students,
judges, elected officials, and concerned Americans who are committed to
ensuring that those values are how our constitution and our justice sys-
tem operate. So it’s very important to us to build the next generation,
which is why the law students are such a critical part of ACS. You’re the
ones who are going to transform this nation for the better.
And we’re in a moment where certainly most of us—even George
Conway, many people on the Right—understand that we’re in a pivotal,
dangerous moment for our democracy. We have real stresses in our con-
stitutional system, our system of separation of powers and checks and
balances.
I know this is why George Conway has founded this group called
Checks and Balances. Because the presidential power has become so
great and the congressional power has been withering. But that’s just to
say we’re here, we exist, because of you. Because we want to work with
the students as well as their mentors, the wonderful law professors you
have here, and the lawyers you work with along the way, to make sure
you succeed even where we might not.
And that is to make sure that those enduring values in the Constitu-
tion really do see themselves expressed in legal decisions in judges —
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and a few of you might become judges. I’d encourage you to think about
it — in cases brought by the others of you who are going to be practicing
lawyers; or carrying out the ideas expressed by the law professors that
you may become or the civil rights lawyers, the environmental lawyers.
Or you could be a corporate lawyer and do pro bono work.
But there are so many ways in which you are going to be responsible
for making this world a better place. And not to put all the burden on
you, but that is really what ACS is all about.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: So, we’re going to dive into part one. And in prepara-
tion for this, we discussed and came up with five sub-topics for part one
and part two. And we’re going to proceed with the dialogue. So, I’m
going to start with topic number one. This is related to matters of confir-
mation. I’ll just lay it out for you.
Very late in the Senate confirmation process for Brett Kavanaugh,
California Senator Dianne Feinstein went public with certain allegations
by Dr. Christine Blasey Ford related to alleged sexual misconduct that
occurred at an earlier period of her life by Brett Kavanaugh. And after
the disclosure of the allegations by Dr. Ford, several other women came
forward with allegations of sexual misconduct.
And there were also related allegations related to excessive drinking
by Brett Kavanaugh that tied in with some of those allegations regarding
the sexual conduct. And then in the context of the actual Senate confir-
mation hearing, both Dr. Ford and Brett Kavanaugh testified to questions
related to those allegations. I’m just sort of framing that.
So, my question to you is what are your thoughts about the extent to
which the process in the senate confirmation hearing was fair? And in
using that word fair, I’m saying both in terms of being fair to Dr. Chris-
tine Blasey Ford, but also being fair to Brett Kavanaugh, as well. And do
you think there are ways that it could have been handled better?
FREDRICKSON: Before I get into the specifics of the Kavanaugh process, I
do think it’s really important to put this in a bigger context. And that is
the process by which this White House and the Senate Republicans have
approached judicial nominations generally and looking back to President
Obama’s final year in office, when Justice Scalia died.
And there was a vacancy created on the Supreme Court, which, in
every other presidency, would have enabled the President to fill that va-
cancy. But because Senator McConnell, who is the Republican leader,
had been basically obstructing every opportunity that President Obama
had to fill any judicial vacancy for two years, they declared immediately
after Justice Scalia passed away that President Obama would not be able
to fill that vacancy, no matter whom he nominated.
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And President Obama, being President Obama, a great conciliator,
somebody who tried to reach across the aisle frequently — some people
might think too frequently or naively; and perhaps particularly so in this
case — nominated a wonderful judge named Merrick Garland, who is a
wonderful judge, but is definitely one of the more moderate members of
the DC Circuit on the older side — a white male — and really trying
very hard to bring along the Republicans, all of whom had served in the
Senate when Merrick Garland was nominated to the DC Circuit. Who
had supported him, and in fact, had even said very affirmatively before
Barack Obama nominated Merrick Garland, that if he were to nominate
somebody like Merrick Garland, well, of course, we would support him.
But once it was, in fact, Merrick Garland, they couldn’t support
Merrick Garland. So, I’m giving you a little of this context. Because I
think it’s important to understand how bitter the Democrats were; how
very much the Democrats felt and many people feel, that the Gorsuch
seat was a stolen seat and that the Supreme Court’s makeup is
illegitimate.
Because the person who should have been on that Court should have
been Merrick Garland. And yet, it wasn’t. So, there’s a lot of anger and
distrust that permeates this whole process. So then when you get to Kav-
anagh, the system had really broken down even further. Because the
President had been told by McConnell, “Don’t nominate Kavanaugh.”
Kavanaugh was not on the original list.
Because Brett Kavanaugh has a record that included millions of
pages of documents that were at the National Archives. Because he
served in government for so long and had been in the White House
Counsel’s office in the Bush Administration in a time when the President
had expressed an incredibly extreme view of presidential authority,
which involved signing statements that suggested that over 1,000 provi-
sions of federal statutes that Congress had passed were unconstitutional,
and basically saying, “I don’t have to abide by these.”
Brett Kavanaugh was involved in all of that. He also worked on the
impeachment of President Clinton, the Starr Report, and so forth. So
there was just an incredible, massive amount of documentation that, in
any other circumstance would have been produced to the Senate, would
have been object for the Senate to spend a lot of time researching to get a
better sense of who is Brett Kavanaugh, what he’s been involved in.
That was not produced. So let me just say how illegitimate this was
that, not only did the Republicans not allow those documents to be pro-
duced—the National Archives said they could do it, it just was going to
take them a little bit of time; they said, “We can get this smaller amount
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of documents for you by six weeks from now.” But even that, Senate
Republicans refused—and the White House.
And instead, they put in charge of the process a White House opera-
tive named Bill Burke, who in the Bush White House, had actually
worked for Brett Kavanaugh. He worked for Brett Kavanaugh, so was
involved, most likely, in a lot of the most controversial decision making
that Brett Kavanaugh was involved in.
So think about somebody who is very self-interested in making sure
that the documents that might implicate Brett Kavanaugh in any type of
illegal actions by the Bush Administration— remember the torture is-
sues; detainees; illegal, warrantless wiretapping—this was all the kinds
of things that Brett Kavanaugh was likely involved in and Bill Burke, as
a result, was also involved in.
So they called out of this much, much, much more massive trove of
documents a very, very, very limited set of documents, pre-approved by
Bill Burke and the White House and given to the Senate. And the Demo-
crats barely got to see those. I know this is a long answer.
But I think it’s just a sort of—we haven’t even gotten to the sexual
assault issues—but we’re already at a place where building on all the
anger and distrust about the Merrick Garland process—but now you have
a situation where the nominee is shrouded in mystery. So that produces
even more doubt. Because people were wondering, “Well, what’s there?
What are you so afraid of?”
PROFESSOR KIBEL: So I think the comments you are setting up are com-
pletely relevant. And I appreciate it. I guess, if you can speak directly.
Both across the political spectrum, there were people who felt that the
way the Senate confirmation hearings proceeded were unfair or maybe,
disrespectful to Dr. Blasey Ford. There were also people on the Right
who felt that it was unfair in some ways—the timing of it, the nature of
it—to Brett Kavanaugh.
I’m just interested in hearing your thoughts—in light of what you
just explained—about the process itself and what your views are of it in
ways, given the allegations that were made, how it might have been han-
dled better?
FREDRICKSON: Right. I think most of you probably recall — I mean,
we’re all kind of riveted on it—there were actually several women who
came forward and in support of Dr. Ford or with their own allegations.
And it seemed like a critical matter to get to the bottom of. And Senator
Flake, Republican from Arizona, asked for an FBI investigation.
However, again, it was in form, but not substance. Because they also
imposed great limits on the FBI. They did not actually talk to most of the
8
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people who were named to support the statements of these women, just a
very small portion of the people that Dr. Christine Blasey Ford men-
tioned, and then not exploring the charges brought by any of these other
women, and done in a very short fashion — produced to the Senate, I
believe, the day before the vote in a single copy for all the Senators to
see.
They have to go to a secure location one by one to read it. So is this
process fair? I think it was a circus. It was so obvious—the more I talk
about it, brings back so many bad memories. I just, you know, I would
love for a moment, if we could change this whole process, and have a
system where our judges were chosen in a rational way to be people who
were committed to upholding the values of the Constitution and inter-
preting the law in a way consistent with the core understandings of legal
interpretation, and that it wasn’t this terrible system.
But I have never seen anything like this. And I have been involved
in a lot of judicial nomination battles. But I think what happened with
Brett Kavanaugh—one of the reasons I think he’s going to bear a stain
for however long he serves on the Court—is that no one—very few peo-
ple—are going to think that he’s there entirely legitimately. Because
there’s so much we don’t know. And yet, and it may still be, and is very
likely to happen, that the documents that were not produced will be made
public at some point in time.
And we will start to actually know what Brett Kavanaugh was in-
volved in. And when you have a Supreme Court who then—when one
finds out who has had his fingerprints on all of these kinds of deci-
sions—I think that’s going to be a profound moment for us to think
through whether we have a process of selecting Justices that is rational or
appropriate.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: So to segue from that, I’m going to skip over one of
the comments. Because you already hit on it in terms of the FBI investi-
gation. But after Brett Kavanaugh testified, there were certain statements
that were made and, sort of in the context of Dr. Ford’s allegations, that
he viewed the whole presentation of the allegations as part of a larger
Clinton-inspired conspiracy and listed a number of people that he
thought were associated with this conspiracy to attack and discredit him
personally.
And after watching this, retired former United States Supreme Court
Justice John Paul Stevens issued a public comment, which was some-
what controversial, which was that having watching Kavanaugh’s re-
sponse to the allegations—particularly laying out this conspiracy
theory—that he thought that Kavanagh lacked the temperament and im-
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partiality to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court; this coming from a former
U.S. Supreme Court Justice that was appointed by a Republican
president.
So I guess my question for you, and it’s a pretty open one: Essen-
tially what do you make of Justice John Paul Stevens’s comments? Do
you think that they were appropriate under the circumstances? And how
do those types of comments speak to the point you just mentioned, which
is, you just called it a, “stain”? But do statements like that during the
confirmation process really go to the credibility of Kavanaugh as a Jus-
tice, and maybe more importantly, the Supreme  Court and the judiciary
as an institution? Is that a narrow question?
FREDRICKSON: It is. And I think what Justice Stevens put his finger on
was something that was very troubling to people who watched the hear-
ings. And did all of you watch the hearings? Yeah. So it was deeply
upsetting in so many ways to see Dr. Ford testify—the trauma. And to
have Brett Kavanaugh react in a way like he was a victim and his tirade,
I think, was very off-putting to people who don’t expect that.
If you’ve watched judicial nomination hearings, particularly Su-
preme Court hearings, the nominees make an enormous effort to be very
calm, to exude judicial temperament in the process, and not to be petu-
lant or angry or indulge in a tirade. And so I think it was just—for people
whose expectations were really upset—and I think what Justice Stevens
was reflecting was, “We’re not comfortable with somebody who is going
to sit on the Supreme Court who behaves this way in front of a nomina-
tions hearing.
What does that bode considering what we are used to? So I think a
lot of it was just expectations about how judges behave and even if sub-
ject to questioning that, some people might feel, was unfair or, you
know, the allegations—perhaps not everybody thought that it was appro-
priate to bring those forward. Even so, I think just the demeanor was
deeply upsetting to people across the spectrum.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: A final question I have and then we’ll open it up, as a
result of the November 2018 elections, the Democrats are now in control
of the House of Representatives. And some of the Democratic members
of the House have indicated their intentions to hold hearings related to
Justice Kavanaugh—in particular, hearings possibly related to whether
he perjured himself as part of the Senate confirmation process. And that
may be separate from what you mentioned about using the hearing pro-
cess possibly to get in some of the documents that weren’t disclosed.
But what I was interested in hearing from you about is: What do you
make of the prospect of the House holding hearings on a sitting Justice
10
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on the Supreme Court about whether he perjured himself during his con-
firmation process? And it’s sort of two-part. One is: Do you see any
precedent for that type of hearing by Congress or the House? And how
might that hearing speak to the issues that you said about the legitimacy
of Kavanaugh as a Justice or the institution of the U.S. Supreme Court?
FREDRICKSON: Well, I’m not laughing because it’s a funny topic. I’m just
thinking about all the investigations that the House is doing right now.
I’m not sure when they’re going to get to Kavanaugh. And they may
have bigger fish to fry. I’m actually testifying myself a week after next
for the House Judiciary Committee on the pardon power.
So their focus right now is on other issues: the role of whether tax
returns should be produced by the President or other matters. So I think
it’s an interesting question. It’s rather unprecedented. Although there was
a process of impeachment against a Supreme Court justice very early in
the new republic. The justice was actually acquitted and stayed on the
Supreme Court.
I think it’s troubling that Kavanaugh may have perjured himself.
Whether or not this is the appropriate way to remedy it, I don’t know. I
think it raises a lot of questions about how politicized do we want our
court system to be. Do we want to open that Pandora’s box of impeach-
ment for justices? Where will it go?
I can certainly see people on the Right who want to impeach justices
who support women’s access to reproductive care. Will it become a sub-
stantive process? I don’t know. I think it has not been indulged by Jerry
Nadler, the Chair of the Committee, I don’t believe. But he’s laid out a
whole list of priorities. I don’t think this is up there or in there at all.
So if the Democratic president wins in the next election and the
House remains in Democratic hands, would they have hearings? They
may well have hearings. Would they start an impeachment process? I’m
still thinking it’s pretty unlikely.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: We’ll open it up to questions. But I wanted to make
one comment. Because it links part one to part two. One of the things
that I find interesting is, if the House Democrats were to call for these
hearings and potentially proceed with impeachment, that would poten-
tially provide precedent for a Republican-controlled House to do that
against appointees by a Democratic president.
So when you switch the roles the question you have is: Is this a
precedent? And I think it relates to some of the discussion we’ll have in
part two about executive authority and why some traditional conservative
voices are somewhat concerned about President Trump’s expansive view
11
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of presidential authority. Because they recognize at some point in time,
you’re going to have a Democratic president back.
And any precedent that you establish for expansive presidential au-
thority is not going to be limited to conservative presidents. It’s going to
apply. So there are some complex issues. But with that, looking at where
we are timewise, let’s spend about ten minutes opening it up.
And I ask for right now, if you could focus your questions about the
confirmation and appointment process. We’re going to have a second
opportunity for questions related to matters of jurisprudence related to
Justice Kavanaugh. So let me open it up now. If you can identify
yourself.
JOHN GALLENGER: I’m John Gallenger. I’m an alum here. And I teach
election law. I think it’s unlikely this president would call you for advice.
But the next president might, as Professor Kibel alluded to.
So in a scenario where the next president has made an appointment
that he [unintelligible] is a good appointment on all the issues—one of
our Supreme Court Justices from California perhaps—and something
similar emerges during the confirmation process; someone comes for-
ward, whether it’s a sexual assault allegation or something else that’s
[unintelligible], and the President called you the day after that. Would
you advise the President to immediately withdraw or stand behind the
nominee? What would your advice be?
FREDRICKSON: You know, I think it’s really important to make sure that
we take allegations seriously. I think we’re all reeling somewhat from
what’s been happening in Virginia. And I don’t think Progressives want
to be hypocritical. We can’t be. It shouldn’t be hypocritical on these re-
ally important issues on whether there has been behavior that violates
someone else’s liberty, personal autonomy.
And so they have to be taken very seriously. Whether that means
absolutely the minute somebody says something, withdrawing. That
seems like the wrong response. Because it would offer too easy a target
for people who oppose the nominee for substantive reasons to dredge up
somebody who might say anything. However, saying that, I do think
there has to be a real investigation.
And I think what we saw with Dr. Ford was that her allegations did
not get taken seriously by this White House and were not explored. If
they had explored them, if there had been a real investigation, and it had
been shown that no such thing has happened, then I think, the stain
would have been removed on Brett Kavanaugh. But I think we have to
live our values.
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And I would never recommend to a president to ignore allegations of
sexual assault against a nominee. I was actually, like the Dean, an em-
ployment and labor lawyer before I went to work on the Hill. These
issues are very important to me. And some of you may have been at a
book talk I did a couple of years ago on my book, “Under the Bus: How
Working Women Are Being Run Over,” which explores a lot of issues
around race and gender in employment, particularly.
And I was the General Counsel and Legal Director of NARAL Pro-
Choice America. I’m absolutely committed to gender equity. And I
would certainly hope that any president who would call me for advice
would be similarly committed. So I hope that answers your question.
STEPHANIE: My name is Stephanie. I’m a 1L here. You had mentioned
that if documents were released in regards to [unintelligible] what Kava-
nagh has been involved in that that would lead to more initiation for the
Senate or for the courts to change the process of selecting justices. Why
is it that numerous sexual allegations haven’t been able to do that? Why
is it that we need those documents to come out?
FREDRICKSON: Well, I think, maybe, not quite exactly what I said. Num-
ber one, it’s important to have a thorough review. For somebody who has
a lifetime appointment—where we’ve never impeached a justice—sitting
on a court that, I think, is so enormously powerful—perhaps more pow-
erful than it has ever been in terms of the impact on the American system
of government, democracy, and personal autonomy. So the idea that we
confirm somebody with having less than a tenth of the documents that
were available is extremely troubling for any normal process and has not
been allowed to happen in the past.
The issue with Kavanaugh was just that the volume of documents
was enormous. . That was their problem; they picked him. And they
shouldn’t have denied Senators the ability to review his record. It’s his
record. Just because it was big, they shouldn’t take it off the table. The
issues of his personal conduct are separate and a separate reason to raise
concerns about him.
Again, it might have been that they went through all the documents
and found out that he never worked on any of the troubling issues. Or he
never perjured himself, which is one of the allegations about when he
was nominated to sit on the DC Circuit. He was asked about his involve-
ment in decisions by the Bush Administration. And it seemed like he
actually said things that were not true.
And so there were concerns that he already perjured himself in his
prior hearing. And so without all those documents, it was hard to know
what he’d been in involved in and whether he had already lied about it.
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The personal allegations were a totally different set of issues. They’re
separate problems for him. And you can’t just sort of say one didn’t
work, and so therefore, the other.
I think you have to remember that these are two very different areas
of concern that were raised about Brett Kavanaugh.
JOE HUTCHINSON: Joe Hutchinson. I’m a 1L. In light of Justice Kava-
naugh’s accusations that there was some kind of conspiracy going on, did
you find it alarming at all that all of the sexual allegations against him
were dropped?
FREDRICKSON: No, actually; not at all. What I find alarming is that Dr.
Ford is still in hiding. She’s actually still under personal death threats;
has not been able to get back to teaching. And I’m very close to some-
body who has been regularly in touch with her who also had worked with
Anita Hill.
So I think if you look at what happens generally, very few allega-
tions of sexual assault are actually brought forward by women particu-
larly, but by all who were assaulted. They’re not necessarily actionable
legally at the point they were brought forward. These women weren’t
expecting him to go to jail. I think they were really concerned about the
idea that he might be on the Supreme Court for the rest of his life and
have the ability to affect all of us in ways that are very hard to remedy.
Apart from a constitutional Amendment, Congress can do very little.
And even if it’s a statutory decision, it’s very rare for Congress to over-
turn the Supreme Court. So actually, no. I think the legal process versus
whether he should be a justice—we weren’t engaged in a courtroom. He
wasn’t on trial for rape or sexual assault. The question was: Should he
have this incredibly privileged office of being a Supreme Court justice
when there are these blemishes on his character? I think it’s a totally
different set of questions and a totally different standard.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: We’ll take one more.
GABE: I’m Gabe. I’m also a 1L at Golden Gate. And my question is with
regard to the nomination process itself and appointment of justices. In an
area where we hope to minimize politics and have a review of our laws,
is there a way that you see, absent a constitutional Amendment, to make
that happen and avoid situations like we had with Garland, and now with
perhaps Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, to where their presence or lack of pres-
ence on the Court is a direct result of politics?
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FREDRICKSON: Thank you. That’s a great question. Actually, there is a lot
of discussion about possible reform ideas for appointment of judges and
justices. There are many who would argue that there should be term lim-
its for Supreme Court justices, some for all of the federal judges, includ-
ing Steve Calabresi, who wrote a law review article with a more liberal
scholar about term limits.
And one of the reasons is that in past times, serving on the Supreme
Court was sort of the capstone of a career. It wasn’t your career. You
don’t get nominated fairly young to serve on the Supreme Court. Like
Earl Warren, he had already been governor of California. He’d had this
incredible record of achievement. And he went up to the Supreme Court
as sort of an elder statesman. Then, the average time of service was eigh-
teen years.
It’s now become such a long period of time that justices serve really
out of whack with the way it has been traditionally. So Steven Calabresi
and another law professor had proposed these 18-year terms. He thinks it
should be, or needs to be, a constitutional Amendment. But many others
argue that it doesn’t need to be—a lot of constitutional law professors;
and you’re probably familiar with all this discussion—who think that
actually, there is no reason that you couldn’t create a senior status for
Supreme Court justices, just as there is on the courts of appeal—on the
trial courts in the federal system.
And you could keep the nine—nine by the way, not in the constitu-
tion; just FYI, it’s just a statute that sets the number—so you could have
your group of nine refreshed regularly. And then the ones who go onto
senior status. after a period of eighteen years could go off and ride the
circuits. So there’s a whole literature about different ways to depoliticize
the process.
You could take the decisions about which cases the Court hears
away from the justices and their clerks who have become more and more
political over years and make that a decision of a group of judges drawn
from the circuit courts or a group of law professors and judges. There are
lots of different ideas about how to approach this.
But I think there are many people, certainly among those that we
work with—many academics—who are thinking really that the system
[Laughs] is not functioning very well. Progressives don’t want to just do
the mirror of what the Right did and jam somebody down, somebody
who doesn’t have the respect or support of many. Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
for those of you who watched RBG, you know she got ninety-three votes
in favor.
As Oren Hatch said in the documentary, “I didn’t agree with her on
many things. But she was certainly qualified. And that’s the President’s
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prerogative.” And so she serves on the Court without this cloud hanging
over her head—that she shouldn’t be there because the process was
warped. And I think it’s very unfortunate. And you see the stature of the
Court going down and down in the views of the American people. Be-
cause they see this process.
And they see the nominees as not being exactly legitimate or being
just as much political players as Senators and House members and the
President. So it’s something I’m very interested in. We have a lot of
literature on it. I would encourage you to look at it. I’m very hopeful.
Because as I said, I find the process pretty sickening. I would rather
spend my time on other things than an increasingly politicized, nasty,
partisan process to choose people who are supposed to be impartial and
neutral. [Laughs] It really is not the best way to do business.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: We are going to move onto part two. We are going to
leave matters of confirmation behind and move onto matters of jurispru-
dence. We have a pretty meaty list of topics. I’m not sure we’re going to
be able to get to all of them. But we will start.
Matter of jurisprudence number one: originalism. Without getting
too far into the jurisprudential weeds, originalism is a school of jurispru-
dence that was certainly embraced by former Justice Antonin Scalia, also
embraced by current Justice Clarence Thomas.
It’s an approach that holds, in general, that where you have constitu-
tional language that is fairly open and is susceptible to multiple interpre-
tations, and you are a judge reviewing or interpreting that language, the
judge should select the interpretation that is most consistent with the un-
derstanding of the people that initially adopted it. That you go back to
that period of time, and that’s the interpretation.
So the question that I have for you—and I’ll start with a fairly open
question, and maybe we can get more specific—is: What are the indica-
tions that Justice Kavanaugh will embrace an Originalist approach? And
how might this affect some of his decision making?
Before we get into it though, I want to bring in the discussion that
we had on the phone as we were preparing for this, which I think is
somewhat relevant. One of the things that Caroline talked about when we
were planning this was an interesting question—and I’ll pose it to all of
you; and maybe you’ll pick up on it, if you want—is: Were the Founding
Fathers Originalists?
Or framed another way: Did the Founding Fathers desire or expect
that their particular notions of what the constitutional language meant
should be controlling on future justices? And I think where this conver-
sation came up is [that] there are certain provisions in the Constitution
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that are very precise, right? Federal courts have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over diversity and federal question.
They weren’t vague about that. They were very specific. Issues of
how many representatives each state gets, or how many Senators each
state gets, or the way the veto process works—the drafters of the Consti-
tution were very clear and precise in those areas.
And yet, in other areas, they chose language like “due process, right
to bear arms, freedom of the press”—much more open language. And I
think what this raises a question of is: Was the choice of using that more
open language that was not defined in a precise way an indication to
provide latitude to future judges to interpret those terms as they deemed
appropriate in the context of their times?
Because if they had wanted to lock in a particular meaning, they
could have done so. And they didn’t. So I’ll let you answer this question
with one last comment. I was with my daughter who just turned fourteen.
And she’s reading Romeo and Juliet. And we were noticing as we were
talking about it, that Shakespeare in general, as a playwright, provides
very little direction in terms of stage direction or costume.
He cares about his words a great deal. But in terms of how you
produce it, no. So when people say, “Well, are you putting on the play in
a way that is true to Shakespeare?” Shakespeare didn’t have any particu-
lar notion of how you were supposed to produce his plays. That’s sort of
reflected from the way he wrote his plays. So with that question hovering
out there . . . .
FREDRICKSON: I seem to remember one very famous stage direction was
something like, “Exit, chased by a bear.”
[LAUGHTER]
PROFESSOR KIBEL: What type of bear?
FREDRICKSON: I don’t know. [Laughs] It was in The Winter’s Tale or
something. Anyway, great question. As you said, there’s no real indica-
tion that the Founders were Originalists. In fact, to the contrary, Thomas
Jefferson said something exactly to the opposite: that we basically
shouldn’t have the dead hand of history determining what we should do
in the future. And that we should be renewing our Constitution at regular
intervals; I think he said every twenty years.
And in fact, it’s instructive to think about what Chief Justice Mar-
shall said. “It is a Constitution we are expounding.” Meaning very much,
that it’s the role of judges to—certainly judicial review—that it’s not a
statute book. It is an inspirational document meant to set the general
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values to guide judges in our nation in how the laws would be adopted
and implemented, but very imprecise on a lot of issues.
And the irony with those who call themselves, “Originalists,” is that
they attempt to lock down this vague meaning; meaning in areas where
it’s convenient—say the Second Amendment; the right to bear arms—
while ignoring the language at the beginning of the Amendment. And
Justice Scalia actually said, “Well, it’s just whatever—verbiage.” You
know, “The militia clause—surplusage.” I can’t remember the exact
word he used. But basically, ignore the man behind the curtain. Just pre-
tend that didn’t exist.
And yet, historians could tell you that the states were very concerned
about their militias being disbanded. And therefore, that language was
really important to them. Because the Second Amendment was about
their militias and the preservation of the independent militias against
what they feared was an overly strong federal government. And so you
could spend a lot of time—and I can find my historian, and you can find
your historian—and we can debate without ever finding evidence that
James Madison said, “My dictionary is better than your dictionary.”
And therefore, we should append that to the Constitution. “I’ll only
look at Webster’s, as opposed to the Oxford.” Whatever. So anyway, that
all being said, Kavanaugh is sort of originally, an Orginalist-ish. He’s not
given lots and lots of speeches about it. But I think you could say he’s
generally a follower of that approach. But again, it’s something of conve-
nience. And when it works, you use it. When it doesn’t work, you aban-
don it.
And I think the Fourth Amendment is a great example of how this
plays out generally with Originalists. So Randy Barnett, who is a well-
known law professor—expounder of the Originalist approach — does
say that it’s actually kind of hard to apply Originalism to contemporary
questions. [Laughs] Well, okay, except the ones that you think we can
apply them too, right?
So in the Fourth Amendment context, somehow, you can draw out
of the protections that existed in the Fourth Amendment—your house
and personal effects—from government intrusion. And we can say in the
modern times, “Well, it’s logical to extend that to your cell phone or
GPS tracking, or if you grow marijuana in your basement, when the cops
come by with their thermal imaging systems and determine whether you
have a heat lamp in your basement.”
It’s probably not a problem anymore in California. [Laughs] It’s all
legal here. But just to say the conservative justices thought that was fine.
And somehow that’s not living constitutionalism? That seems to me that
is exactly what the more progressive constitutional law scholars would
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say, which is [that] you look at the principals behind these provisions:
protection of your personal autonomy from government intrusion and
that should protect what’s on your computer and maybe your body and
so forth.
I think that’s one of the reasons that Originalism is critiqued so eas-
ily as being very outcome-oriented and basically, only ever produces
conservative outcomes.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: So apart from general critiques of Originalism, given
what you know about how Brett Kavanaugh approaches it, do you see
certain types of issues—constitutional or otherwise—where you see him
(whether you agree with it or not is a separate question) but where you
anticipate or see him applying an Originalist approach to those issues or
constitutional questions?
FREDRICKSON: You know, I think it’s sort of an ad hoc — he’s not been
extremely doctrinaire. And so I think he is going to be in the same camp
that Gorsuch is in, that Scalia was in—that when it works, it works, and
when it doesn’t, you abandon it. Not like Clarence Thomas, who is sort
of uniquely almost consistent in his approach to—he wants to throw out
every precedent that he believes is inconsistent with his view of the Con-
stitution. It’s a very radical idea.
A lot of you are 1Ls? Any 2Ls or 3Ls? So you’ve spent some time
talking and thinking about stare decisis and sort of the way that the com-
mon law develops. One of the things I think is very frightening about the
kind of people who consider themselves, or call themselves, “Extreme
Originalists,” is their willingness to abandon that approach to the evolu-
tionary process of the law; something that gives our legal system stabil-
ity, gives litigants some idea of what the law says.
It is profoundly an element of rule of law. People know when they
go into a courtroom, the law that the courts will apply, and somebody
like Clarence Thomas will just throw that out the window; and it doesn’t
matter how old the precedent is or how long it’s been relied on by courts
subsequently. If he thinks it’s not consistent with his view of the Consti-
tution, it’s got to go no matter what impact that has on the legal system.
Kavanagh is not like that. I mean, he’s more consistent in wanting a
conservative outcome. If originalism works, he’ll use it. If it doesn’t, he
won’t.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: We’ve got a couple questions here. I’m going to turn
to one about presidential authority, just to make sure we get into that.
Another important constitutional question that comes up is the issue of
the scope and limits of presidential authority. In terms of Neil Gorsuch,
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who also at times is an Originalist, my understanding — you can correct
me here — one of the tenants of Gorsuch’s originalism is that he thinks
the Founding Fathers were particularly concerned about excessive presi-
dential authority; essentially, the prospect of the president becoming a
king that was above the law.
So Gorsuch is an originalist that ends up, at least in some of his
scholarship, taking a somewhat limited view of executive branch author-
ity. Because he thinks that’s consistent with the Founding Fathers. My
understanding is that—at least in his legal career, some of his opinions,
but also some of the work he did in the Bush Administration—Kava-
naugh is an Originalist that has not come to the same conclusion as Gor-
such and actually used executive authority very expansively.
We’ll talk a little later about the border and more specifics. But to
open it up more generally, do you see potential tension or clashes be-
tween Gorsuch and Kavanagh on this issue of executive branch presiden-
tial authority—a rift within the conservative wing of the Court?
FREDRICKSON: Yeah. Well, I certainly hope so in part, because I think
there’s so much at stake. The Supreme Court may have cases in front of
it that deal with the Mueller investigation. And I think this is going to be
a very important question to see if the conservative justices all step up to
protect the President at the expense of checks and balances, at the ex-
pense of rule of law.
Will Gorsuch break? I don’t know. I hope so. But I think it’s really
important to note what tradition Brett Kavanaugh comes out of. There’s
something called the “Unitary Executive.” Have any of you encountered
this? I see you have. So you know this is a view, as expounded by Steve
Calabarasi, that all executive power resides in the president.
And therefore, everything that happens in the executive branch must
be determined by the president; that is, he can hire and fire everybody.
Congress has no ability to delegate to these administrative agencies.
There’s a whole set up building up of the presidential power in an ex-
treme way that is very controversial, especially because the Constitution
does not say all executive power shall be vested in the president.
And even the original Constitution separates power, not just between
executive, judiciary, and legislative, but also among the branches there
are different—and at the time the Constitution was created, there were
prosecutors that were run by judges— that were appointed by judges.
There was a whole array of ways that things were mixed constitutionally.
But this vision means that the Congress can’t put any limits on the
President’s ability to fire somebody. So creating an independent
prosecutorial model, like a special counsel, is very illegitimate under that
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol50/iss2/4
2020] Discussion Transcript 93
view. And so that’s where sort of this tension will come up. Is the inves-
tigation legitimate? Could the President simply terminate Mueller or any
of those others without process?
And I think that case may well be coming. Does the President have
to respond to a subpoena? Is the President, in fact, above the law? I
think, as you said, the possibility that Gorsuch—and I think it’s self-
evident, personally—that one of the reasons we had a revolution was to
not have a king, was to not have somebody with absolute power, but in
fact, have a democracy subject to checks and balances.
I think Kavanaugh’s view is very frightening and is not just a-histor-
ical, but is actually contrary to a fundamental understanding of what gave
rise to the American republic.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: So I’m going to segue from that more general discus-
sion about executive authority to some more current events dealing spe-
cifically with the fall. And I may encourage you to speculate a little
about what you know about how Kavanaugh might approach this. As
many of you know, last month, Congress did not provide full funding for
the border wall with Mexico.
President Trump issued a national emergency declaration where he
indicated that he was going to reallocate certain funds from the military
and the Defense Department to make up for the shortfall to complete the
border wall. What is interesting to note—and I will welcome your
thoughts on this Caroline—in connection with Trump’s declaration of
the national emergency to complete the border wall, many leading con-
servative voices, not ACS, have taken the position that the President’s
use of a national emergency declaration to complete the wall is
inappropriate.
And the two that I wanted to mention specifically are the magazine
The National Review and the Cato Institute in Washington DC. In Febru-
ary 15, The National Review wrote that President Trump’s national
emergency declaration, “Is the proclamation of the monarch, not an argu-
ment by a president.” This gets back to King George III. “And that it
should fail in court.”
The National Review article went on to state, “A border wall is a
civilian structure to be manned by civilian authorities to perform a civil-
ian mission. The troops would not be creating a military fortification for
military Use. Not only is the wall not military construction, it’s also not
necessary to support the Use of armed forces, unless one wants to make
the fantastical argument that the wall somehow protects the troops who
are building the wall.”
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The Cato Institute, a well-established conservative voice, wrote also
on February 19, 2019, an article on it at the Cato At Liberty blog: “No
reasonable person can look at the southern border and agree that it rises
to the level of a national emergency.” The Cato Institute article contin-
ued, “The most common argument in favor of the national emergency is
that there is an epidemic of immigration-induced crime and death on the
border. This is simply not the case. The crime rate in the twenty-three
counties along the U.S. border with Mexico is below that of the counties
in the United States that do not lie on the border.”
“Violent and property crime rates are both slightly lower along the
border. And the homicide rate along the border is 35 percent below the
homicide rate in non-border counties. Resident illegal immigrants are
less likely to be incarcerated or convicted of crimes than native-born
Americans. The estimated illegal incarceration rate in 2016 was 47 per-
cent below that of native-born Americans.”
Where I’m going with this is, one, I’m curious to hear about the
extent to which ACS as an organization is actually collaborating, or in
discussions with, groups like the Cato Institute and The National Review,
with whom you often don’t align.
And two, as you think about a case coming before the Supreme
Court over, essentially, whether this national emergency using these
funds in this way is constitutional. And Justice Kavanaugh—how does
information like this coming from the Right, The National Review, the
Cato Institute affect—we’re obviously speculating—the way a justice
like Kavanaugh would approach this question?
FREDRICKSON: Well, it’s a very good question. And it is important to
understand that these pubic expressions of concern are really rather new
for many on the Right, particularly The National Review. Cato is a little
bit different. And if you’re not familiar with Cato, it’s a Libertarian or-
ganization. It has always stood a little bit apart from the Republican
Party. It was outspoken in favor of gay marriage.
And immigration is another place where it’s an organization that
we’ve been able to work with. The National Review, however, is gener-
ally extremely conservative on pretty much everything. So that was very
interesting to see expressions of concern coming out of that quarter.
But I think what we’re seeing is that, for these conservative organi-
zations that have been identified with the idea that we should have a
small government, that we’re worrying about overweening power—even
if they think that perhaps, in the constitutional structure, the President is
stronger than we might think the President should be—the federal gov-
ernment still should not be that enormous and powerful.
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And I think looking at a president able to override traditional separa-
tion of powers—that the Congress is the body that appropriates and de-
termines where money goes; it’s the classic determination of what the
Congress does is the budget, and that the President can simply ignore—I
think is very troubling to them.
So I think it may give some ability for the conservative justices to
feel a little bit more empowered to start to question the President. In the
travel ban case, they didn’t do that so much. So we’ll see. But even if the
justices don’t, there’s a lot of unease among those on the Right who are
really worried about where this could be going.
The idea that a president could redo the appropriations process and
ignoring—in this situation we have here is that Congress was in the Re-
publican control for two years of Trump’s presidency and never funded
this wall, despite Donald Trump asking them to; so basically, rejection of
that funding demand. So we have a direct clash here. It remains to be
seen.
I think Kavanaugh himself has expressed extreme deference to presi-
dential authority and this idea of the Unitary Executive. Whether Gor-
such or John Roberts is willing to go along with that, that’s where your
questions are.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: We don’t know. And obviously, some of the concerns
that we’re seeing here are related to any precedent that would be estab-
lished by upholding President Trump’s ability to do this with the national
wall could be relied on by a Democratic President for other national
emergencies. I think Nancy Pelosi hinted at nation gun violence — we
think that’s a national emergency.
FREDRICKSON: Climate change.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Climate change. So there’s some recognition that the
argument, while it may support a Republican president now, could estab-
lish a precedent that would run.
FREDRICKSON: And in areas where you actually show there was an
emergency.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Yeah. So I’m going to skip ahead to our fifth topic,
partially because of time. But partially because I think it relates to the
executive. And this relates to the issue of judicial review of administra-
tive agencies. And this is actually a little more in my wheelhouse. Be-
cause I deal with natural resources and environmental agencies and the
relationship of judicial review of agency actions and being part of that.
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So as some of you may know, particularly those of you who’ve
taken environmental law or some courses involving administrative law,
about three decades ago there was a decision, Chevron v U.S. Supreme
Court, which focused on when federal agencies are interpreting statues
where the language is arguably somewhat ambiguous or susceptible to
multiple interpretations, what should be the role of judicial review in
reviewing those agency interpretations.
And what came out of the Chevron case is what’s known as the
Chevron doctrine or Chevron deference, which is essentially this: that if
the agency’s interpretation of an arguably ambiguous or open statute is a
reasonable one, the reviewing court should not substitute its own view
for the agency’s. That is the deference part of it. And in some sense,
because these are executive agencies, especially if you adopt a Unitarian
view, this is the executive branch interpreting it.
Sorry to keep pitting Gorsuch against Kavanaugh. But it’s very con-
venient. Justice Gorsuch has done a fair amount of scholarship and some
concurring and dissenting opinions indicating that he is somewhat un-
comfortable with Chevron deference. And he questions whether it’s ap-
propriate for courts—judges—to delegate to agencies the task of
interpreting statutes. He’s gone so far as to suggest it may actually be an
unconstitutional abdication. Not quite sure where he is on that.
But I guess my question on that in terms of Justice Kavanaugh . . . .
Obviously, a lot of the work of the government is undertaken not by
Congress; it’s undertaken by the agencies that implement these statutes.
What do we know or what do you think might be Kavanaugh’s approach
to this issue of judicial review of agency actions and interpretation and
the viability of Chevron deference?
FREDRICKSON: It’s an important question. And actually, they are very
aligned. Kavanaugh has been extremely critical of Chevron deference. I
actually have a quote from him. He wrote an article in the Harvard Law
Review where he critiqued explicitly the Chevron doctrine. He gave a
speech at Notre Dame. He said, “The Chevron doctrine encourages
agency aggressiveness on a large scale.” So the Unitary Executive theory
is inconsistent with deference to agency decision making.
Because agencies were given this role by statute to be able to flesh
out—you don’t want Congress to write statutes that are going to lay out
every single provision in terms of what the EPA should do to understand
how many parts per billion of some kind of a chemical you can have in
the water, and you can still meet the Clean Water Act tests.
So Congress writes the statutes and leaves to the agencies to draft
regulations based on their expertise and understanding of what Congress
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was intending. So the critique of Chevron is that it was inappropriate.
Congress cannot create this system where the agencies have the power to
interpret statutes apart from what the President wants them to do, right?
So it is sort of the flipside of the same understanding of the strong role of
the presidency and that can’t be divided and undermined by this kind of
independence of these executive branch agencies.
So the two of them are quite consistent together on this. And I think
for those of us who believe that many of these statutes that have been
interpreted by the agencies, including the Clean Water Act and the Clean
Air Act, worker protection areas like the OSHA Act—Occupational
Safety And Health—that it’s critical that you have this expertise in the
agencies to be able to determine, and with greater specificity than Con-
gress can, how to protect people to make sure that children aren’t going
to school with lead in the water system, that the air we breathe is rela-
tively clean, and that workers aren’t working in incredibly dangerous
conditions in a factory.
So this is an area where these extreme views are going to clash with
what the vast majority of Americans expect their government to do.
We’ve benefitted so much from these vital statutes—you know better
than anybody—the Clean Water Act. It used to be that rivers would burst
into flames in this country, before the Clean Water Act was passed, from
industrial waste. We’ve done a lot to repair that. And this extreme view
would undermine the agency’s ability to do that.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: I think, based on my experience with the Chevron
doctrine, one of the interesting aspects is the way it cuts both ways politi-
cally. So when I was in law school, learning about the Chevron doctrine,
it was the case Chevron—Natural Resources Defense Council v. Chev-
ron—was a situation where the agency had interpreted—this was in the
Bush—I—Reagan Administration—the statute such that it limited envi-
ronmental protection.
So the view was that Chevron enabled a Republican administration
to interpret environmental statutes narrowly to undercut environmental
protection. But what was interesting to watch under Chevron is that the
Clinton Administration came in. And they issued regulations. And Chev-
ron deference actually upheld those. So it actually didn’t really end up
being a Left-Right issue.
And what I think is interesting is that if you think, “Okay, you’re
opposed to Chevron deference,” well, the Trump Administration right
now is busy issuing interpretations of statutes to which a court should
have no deference. It should substitute its own view. So regardless of
which side you—you may have different views.
25
Kibel and Fredrickson: Discussion Transcript
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
98 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
FREDRICKSON: I disagree with that, actually, and fundamentally. Because
I think that the role of government is seen so differently by Democratic
presidents and Republican presidents. And to have an effective adminis-
trative state that actually was able to provide these protections for the
environment and so forth, certainly there are going to be some examples
where Chevron cuts the other way.
But I think that the construct of deference to the expertise in the
agencies generally is protective, as opposed to—and I’ll say this, because
the way that the courts have approached Donald Trump’s efforts to undo
regulations has actually been very critical in most places. Because what
they’re just tried to do is ignore the facts and just repeal the regulations.
You actually have to go through a whole process. You have to have
data under the Administrative Procedures Act that has some rational ba-
sis for why you’re making the changes. And they haven’t bothered to do
that. So they’ve gotten caught up thinking—again, sort of the imperial
presidency at work—but this Administration has not felt that it needs to
abide by that kind of rule making process.
And so for those of you who are ACS members, which I hope means
is all of you, we’ve actually been engaging our chapters, our members,
and a lot of students particularly to participate in the rule making process
by filing comments as this Administration has tried to change the rules
around a whole variety of issues and women’s healthcare, and particu-
larly Title IX, Title X regulations, for family planning and so forth.
Because it’s really important to express the views of how these stat-
utes should be understood, what the regulations should look like. Be-
cause they actually have to look at these comments. And they have to
account for them. Even if they are going to say, “I disagree with it,” they
can’t just say, “I disagree with it,” and that’s the end of it. They have to
say, “I disagree with it. And here’s why.”
It might be that their arguments aren’t very persuasive. But they ac-
tually have to put some data in there. So it’s sort of a long answer. But I
think that’s why the Chevron case has elicited much more critique on the
Right than on the Left.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: So, we have five topics. But I’m looking at the time.
And I’m going to cut to the last one so we have time for questions. And
it returns to some of your earlier work before coming to ACS.
I wanted to ask you some questions about abortion and women’s
reproductive rights. So February 2019 US Supreme Court decision in
June Medical Services vs. Gee, Justice Kavanaugh, in one of his first
opinions on the Court, issued a dissenting opinion that advocated for
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upholding the Louisiana law that imposed limits on when abortions could
be performed.
So, I guess my question for you, using the June Medical Services
case as a starting point, is: What does his dissenting opinion in June
Medical Services, as well as his other opinions on the DC Court of Ap-
peals, tell us about how he approaches the issues of abortion and wo-
men’s reproductive rights?
FREDRICKSON: I think he gave us a very strong indication of how he’s
approaching it. For those of you who haven’t followed this case, this is
an exact repeat of a case called Whole Women’s Health. It dealt with the
same kind of limitations of the state trying to impose additional require-
ments on clinics that serve women that are unrelated to medical need—in
fact, contrary— made it much more expensive to run these clinics; made
it harder to find doctors that had admitting privileges at the local hospi-
tal; turning the center into basically a full-fledged hospital; and making it
result in these places shutting down most of the clinics and eliminating
the ability of women to get reproductive care, including abortion.
And so Whole Women’s Health was decided. And they found that it
was an undue burden under the Casey standard to impose these new re-
quirements. Well, this case presents the exact same issue. And we see
where this court will go with one more vote. And it was actually surpris-
ing that they didn’t flip Whole Women’s Health so quickly.
It was just with Justice Kennedy stepping off the court. We’re very
close to seeing those kinds of cases starting to go the other way. But I
think Kavanaugh has announced where he is. And I think we’ve got a lot
to worry about.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Can you tell, for those of us who haven’t read his
dissenting opinion, a little about what he announced in terms of what his
position is?
FREDRICKSON: I think what he said was they have to go back and prove
that this would actually—in much more detail—how this would actually
limit the clinic’s ability to function. They already had all that data. It was
just a way of giving the state another bite at the apple.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: I had some questions in here also about federalism.
But I think looking at where we are time-wise, maybe we’ll get to them
in question and answer. But I want to leave some time for all of you. So
let’s open it up. And once again, part two is really focused on what we’re
calling matters of jurisprudence rather than the appointment process. So
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if you could try to focus your questions there, that would be great. Yes,
Professor Christensen in the back.
PROFESSOR CHRISTIANSEN: This relates directly to the question you just
answered about the Whole Women’s Health transition. It seems to me
that the person it’s hard to be right now is Chief Justice Roberts. With
the Court as it’s aligned now, there are going to be so many issues. And
we already saw that [unintelligible].
When [unintelligible] the Court is ready to radically reverse itself
from a decision that happened in the last 10 years? [Unintelligible] tran-
sition from a conservative Court with some moderates in the middle to a
conservative Court without moderates in the middle. What do you think
is going to happen? Are we going to see decisions where we [unintel-
ligible], more radical option [unintelligible]?
Or are we going to see a lot of decisions where we just redefine
[unintelligible]? Are we going to see an overturning of [Unintelligible]
and marriage equality? Are we just going to see increased religious ex-
emptions? And I want you to answer that question. But also, in the con-
text of—I’m a constitutional law professor; I like to [unintelligible]. And
when I look for the fifth vote to uphold marriage equality on the current
or to uphold Casey, I [unintelligible].
FREDRICKSON: Well, I think that’s math. It’s not much you can do about
that. So math matters. I am extremely frightened about what this means. I
think the Chief Justice does have concerns about the legitimacy of the
Court and what it looks like to reverse. It’s not just reversing a precedent
that you could say, “Well, it was forty years ago. Times have changed.”
But to reverse a precedent from two years ago, because one justice has
changed.
I think it’s very unsettling; the idea that it’s so easy to manipulate
that way and on such profound matters. So I think he’ll be concerned
about the optics of that. That being said, he’d like to overturn Casey, and
he wasn’t with the majority on Whole Women’s Health. So he does not
agree. And in this case, he simply was saying, “The Court shouldn’t be
doing this, this way.”
I think Obergefell is another one where he may try and moderate
where the Court goes. You’ll see Thomas and Gorsuch and Kavanaugh
and Alito saying, “It was wrong. Throw it out, whatever the conse-
quences.” I think Roberts will try and do the religious exemptions in-
stead, and say, “Okay, you can get married.”
“But if a photographer doesn’t want to come to your wedding, that’s
okay, no matter what the state’s statutes say—the human rights statutes
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say—the florist, the baker, and the dressmaker, the whatever.” And then
all of the sudden you’d see LGBTQ people can get married, but they
actually can’t get married in a church. And they can’t get married in a
restaurant.
And they can be excluded from . . . . It’s very contrary to the way we
understand our Constitution under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
implications that religious exemptions can trump these basic fundamental
human rights. Where does it stop? Does it stop with race? Is race differ-
ent? Is religion different? Do you do it to Muslims, Jews? I mean, these
are really profound questions.
I think it’s scary enough in the religious exemption. I don’t think he
wants them to go and overturn Obergefell and Roe in an explicit way.
Because that gets everybody’s attention in a way that these other deci-
sions don’t.
So I think five is the magic number. And I think for anybody who
didn’t vote in the presidential election—and I’m not endorsing a candi-
date and I’m not partisan—but I tell you if any of these things matter to
you, I certainly hope you participate and get everybody you know to
participate in the upcoming elections. Because these are all choices that
are going to be determined by who sits on the Supreme Court. And there
will be other vacancies shortly, no doubt.
MATTHEW BASANT: I’m Matthew Basant. I’m a 3L here and I’m also the
Golden Gate University ACS President. My question is: With the way
the First Amendment has blossomed to the forefront in the last few years,
do you think that the current makeup is likely to take any large stance
about free speech, particularly, free political speech? There’s one case in
particular that’s originating out of Pennsylvania where a rapper was con-
victed. And that was upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for
terrorist threats in a song. So I was just wondering if you have any
thoughts about how free speech might transform under this current
[unintelligible]?
FREDRICKSON: It’s a great question. One of the things that is of great
concern is in the area of money in politics. The whole line of cases start-
ing with Buckley, Citizens United—there are still a few provisions of
that original post-Watergate campaign finance reform legislation still
standing. I think the Court may find that spending limits—they’re gone;
contribution limits . . .
Billionaires can spend as much money as they want on independent
expenditures. Corporations—there are very little limits on coordination
between independent expenditures and campaign funds. I think that
under the view of the majority of this Court, it may all come tumbling
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down. And we will just have a free-for-all where money is free to do
anything in politics. It’s very dismaying.
I think some of the issues about hate speech and violent speech are
more difficult to see exactly how the court comes out; how they dealt
with the patent case with The Slants. And there’s no coherence in it. So
it’s hard for me to exactly . . . . And if you have any thoughts . . . .
PROFESSOR CHRISTIANSEN: It just doesn’t break down on that traditional
liberal-conservative . . . And [unintelligible].
FREDRICKSON: They tend to sort of have their own—bring their own—
personal views into this. Think about the Crush videos. You read those
cases with the—gross, I won’t even describe them. But I think Alito in
that one—even though he wants to dismantle every remaining piece of
campaign finance legislation—he really thought it was terrible that these
videos showed little animals being crushed. And you can limit the First
Amendment rights of people watching these terrible videos.
But you can’t limit the rights of the Koch brothers to intervene in
politics in any way they want to. So I think the First Amendment is a
mess. This court has completely destroyed any coherent understanding. I
actually have to recommend a book called, “Madison’s Music,” which is
a wonderful First Amendment book.
And it talks about the First Amendment as being a democracy-en-
hancing Amendment and how each provision is sort of about your own
personal protection of conscience, protection of speech, protection of ad-
vocacy—basically, your ability to petition the government. It moves
from the personal and individual conscience level to the participation in
the political process.
I think it’s a very compelling argument for how the First Amend-
ment should be understood, which then leads you to: Buckley v. Vallejo
is wrongly decided; Citizens United, wrongly decided; Free Speech Now,
wrongly decided—all of those. Because they don’t understand that the
First Amendment is actually about enhancing democracy, as opposed to
allowing rich people to buy it.
GABE FLEISCHER: Gabe Fleischer; 1L. In looking at gay marriage, the
right to choose, how do we balance out in a constitutional aspect wo-
men’s right to choosee, while in the instance of gay marriage, looking a
different direction when we look at say a baker’s right to choose or a
dress maker’s right to choose who they provide services to? How do you
balance out those choice factors and [unintelligible]?
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FREDRICKSON: I would say that’s a bit of a confusion, I think, in how you
pose the question. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protec-
tion of the law to all people. And that means that you can’t be denied
services. And under the civil rights laws, which were Congress interpret-
ing the meanings of those constitutional Amendments, they understood
that when you are actually running a business, and you are accredited by
the government—you have the license and all that—you have to serve
everybody. Have you taken con law yet?
GABE FLEISCHER: I have.
FREDRICKSON: So the famous cases involving public accommodations,
the—Heart of Atlanta Hotel, thank you; it’s been a long time since I’ve
been in law school—people were saying it violates our religious right.
We don’t want to have African Americans staying here. Or if they didn’t
want to serve them in the restaurants, at the lunch counters. It’s exactly
the same argument they made.
There’s been very consistent understanding that, under our civil
rights statutes, there are an appropriate understanding of the Constitution
that services cannot be denied to people for illegitimate reasons. And that
is based on who you are. And so the same argument has got to apply, in
my mind and I think in the minds of people who understand the constitu-
tion as expressing those core values. You can’t deny people services in
this country based on the color of their skin, their gender, their sexual
orientation, their religion, and their national origin.
So, if you’re practicing your business, just as though you can’t deny
African Americans the right to stay in your hotel, you can’t deny gay
Americans the right to stay in your hotel. It’s the exact same principal.
So, I think where it gets distorted is the argument that you’re making—
the way the other side; the people who want to deny LGBTQ people their
full autonomy as human beings—they set that up as the choice, right?
It’s like it’s an equivalent choice. It’s not.
If you’re doing business, it’s like any other business you have to
have access for people with disabilities, right? You could say, “I raise a
constitutional objection to putting a ramp to come up the stairs into my
building. Because my religion says I don’t have to serve people in a
wheelchair.” We reject that argument. Because it’s not a good one.
We’re not allowing people to discriminate based on who you are as a
human being, an immutable characteristic.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: So, I’m going to exercise a prerogative and ask the
final question, since it was in our list anyway. And we didn’t get to it,
because we’re getting near the end of our time. The topic or question we
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had discussed related to federalism: the relationship between the federal
government and federal law and state governments and state law. And
there are a number of issues related to this.
But two of them that we had flagged. One is the issue of federal
preemption of state law. And the other is that we do have certain federal
laws that, in the statute, preserve a particular place for state law. And I’ll
mention two of those. And then I’ll propose it as a question related to
Kavanaugh. The United States Bureau of Reclamation runs a lot of large
water projects in the western United States, including the Central Valley
Project here in California.
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act says that the Bureau of Reclama-
tion has to comply with state water law in operating its projects, which is
very relevant in California where we’re dealing with fisheries and re-
leases from dams and issues of how they operate those structures.
Another example would be something called the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act—the CZMA. The CZMA provides the federal government
with authority to approve certain off-shore activities like oil drilling. But
it says that they need to make a consistency determination; that it’s con-
sistent with state coastal policy, which provides our state Coastal Com-
mission with the opportunity to adopt policies that the federal
government has to act consistently with.
So, to frame this as a question: If I can bring that back to Kava-
naugh, kind of like with Chevron deference, in the past thirty or forty
years, the issue of state’s rights has been framed primarily as a conserva-
tive effort to restrict overreaching preemption by the federal government.
Certainly, that’s been the case in the areas that I work in: environment
and natural resources.
Yet, now, we’re seeing what ACS and others have described as pro-
gressive federalism, where states like California are looking for a restric-
tive view of federal preemption and expansive view of state’s rights to
protect themselves from what the federal government is doing. What is
your sense of Kavanaugh’s position on the issue of state’s rights and
federalism, and more particularly, how it might relate to progressive fed-
eralism and the use of state law with positions that are maybe more often
associated with the political Left?
FREDRICKSON: It’s interesting. I think federalism and preemption are
somewhat akin to originalism and textualism with Kavanaugh.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Convenient?
FREDRICKSON: Convenient, yeah. And you can see in a range of issues,
he’s had some rulings in the First Amendment where efforts at the local
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level to provide net neutrality are preempted. Those internet companies’
First Amendment rights are prevalent. So preemption, he believes in,
there. Gun regulation—another area where one expects him to be
favorable to efforts to preempt, to challenge, local restrictions.
But when it came to abortion, he’s got a different approach. So it’s
kind of a mixed bag. It’s rather outcome-driven. He’s certainly very def-
erential to the state—to Louisiana—when it comes to restrictions on wo-
men’s access to the clinics. So I think federalism is one of those where
we’ll figure it out after we get the outcome; work your way backwards.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: I’m sure you’re familiar with the Dean at Yale Law
School. Heather Gerken has written a lot about federalism and progres-
sive federalism. And she coined a phrase which I really think is spot on,
which is, “Fair-weather federalism.”
FREDRICKSON: [Laughs]
PROFESSOR KIBEL: And she said it applies to the Right and the Left, that
people are really not as intellectually or ideologically committed to
state’s rights or the federal government as they often proclaim. They’re
more committed to the issues that they care about. And if state law will
allow them to get there, they’ll argue for state’s rights in federal law.
And I think her point was simply that both on the political Left and
political Right, many of us are actually fair-weather federalists. [Laughs]
And I think there’s a fair amount of truth to that. So with that, I would
like to once again thank you for making the journey and sharing your
thoughts with us.
FREDRICKSON: Thank you very much.
[Applause]
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Any closing thoughts, pitches, insights for us?
FREDRICKSON:  No, I just encourage you all to join ACS. You’ve got the
President here who can sign you up right now. Participate in the process;
run for office; vote for people; become a judge. But just participate how-
ever you can to make this country a better place. I want to thank you in
advance for all you’re going to do.
PROFESSOR KIBEL: Okay, great.
[Applause]
[End of recorded material]
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